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Abstract—We show that noninterference and transparency,
the key soundness theorems for dynamic IFC libraries, can be
obtained “for free”, as direct consequences of the more general
parametricity theorem of type abstraction. This allows us to give
very short soundness proofs for dynamic IFC libraries such as
faceted values and LIO. Our proofs stay short even when fully
mechanized in the Agda proof assistant. Moreover, our proofs
cover the actual Agda implementations of the libraries, not just
an abstract model.
1 Introduction
The goal of information flow control (IFC) research is to
develop language-based techniques to ensure that security
policies relating to confidentiality and integrity of data are
followed, by construction. This paper is about a recent in-
carnation of this idea: IFC as a library. This appealing
approach, pioneered by Li and Zdancewic [1] and champi-
oned by Russo et al. [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12]
among others [13, 14, 15], promises to ease the integration of
IFC techniques into existing software development pipelines,
by replacing the specialized languages, compilers, and run-
time systems traditionally needed for IFC applications, with
libraries providing similar guarantees. Practically speaking,
programming with an IFC library is similar to programming
with a specialized IFC language, with one exception: Rather
than being stand-alone, the library integrates with and uses
the features of its host language to provide an interface that
guarantees that all client programs are secure.
These libraries enforce IFC using two key language features:
Controlling side effects: most IFC libraries are imple-
mented in safe [16] Haskell [17], a language that allows
the library author to enforce type-based control over side
effects (with the exception of non-termination).
Abstraction: all IFC libraries rely on type abstraction to
provide data confidentiality and integrity.
But embedding IFC as a library risks leaving a gap in the
soundness proofs, which usually do not cover how the library
interacts with the host language. Indeed, the typical soundness
proofs work by constructing a model of the library as a more-
or-less standard IFC calculus, for which the authors prove
some variant of the noninterference security property [18]. So
although these noninterference proofs are sometimes mechani-
cally verified [7, 10, 11, 13, 14], they give no guarantees about
the realization of the calculus as a library.
The formal connection between the calculus and the library,
which relies on host language features such as type abstraction,
was so far almost never investigated. This can have important
security consequences. For instance, Stefan et al. [19] claimed
that their concurrent LIO Haskell library for dynamic IFC
protects against so-called “internal timing attacks” (attacks
where the program itself can observe and exploit secret-
dependent timing information). However, Buiras and Russo
[20] later demonstrated that this was not the case: Haskell’s
lazy evaluation permits reliably bypassing the mechanisms of
Stefan et al., enabling reliable internal timing attacks [20, 21].
And while we do not yet deal with concurrency and timing
attacks, we are the first to provide formal guarantees covering
the actual code of dynamic IFC libraries, such as LIO. The
key to scaling security proofs to concrete implementations of
dynamic IFC libraries is employing better proof techniques.
In this paper we provide simpler proofs for the imple-
mentations of two different kinds of dynamic IFC libraries.
On the one hand, we study the original (sequential) LIO
library [3], in which individual values can be labeled with
metadata specifying their confidentiality and integrity levels
and computations carry a “current label” that soundly over-
approximates the level of already inspected labeled values.
On the other hand, we study a library based on faceted
values [7, 22], which are decision trees that can evaluate to
different values based on the privilege level of the observer.
These two styles reflect the most common ways to enforce
dynamic IFC as a library.
To prove noninterference in a simple way, we give semantics
to the libraries in terms of logical relations. Every type T
induces a relation JT K, such that every well-typed program
p : T is related to itself with respect to the binary relation
induced by T . This connection between terms, types, and
logical relations is called the fundamental lemma of logical
relations, or the abstraction theorem [23], or parametricity. In
his seminal work, Reynolds [23] uses this technique to show
that users of an abstract type can never observe the details of
its implementation. In this paper we apply this idea to dynamic
IFC, showing that noninterference for dynamic IFC libraries
is a direct consequence of the same parametricity theorem.1
In practice, we implement the dynamic IFC libraries in a
language with dependent types. This allows us to program
our libraries and their clients in the same formalism we use
to reason about the security of such programs. We also use
1Theorems directly obtained from parametricity are often called free
theorems [24], thus the title of this paper.
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the fact that (dependent) types are turned mechanically to
logical relations and programs are turned mechanically to
proofs of satisfaction of such relations, and everything remains
neatly expressible within the framework of a language with
dependent types [25]. This way, we do not need to prove any
fundamental lemma for our logical relations, and additionally
the junction between implementation and theory is watertight.
This proof technique was recently applied by Algehed
and Bernardy [26] to show the noninterference of static IFC
libraries. The work in this paper differs in two crucial ways:
1) We show that the same technique can be applied to prove
noninterference for dynamic IFC libraries. While this
might seem counterintuitive at first, since parametricity
is a property of type abstraction, which is a static
enforcement mechanism, our work shows formally that
dynamic IFC libraries ultimately achieve their security
also from type abstraction.
2) We show that the same proof technique can be used to
prove more than just noninterference. Specifically, we
use the parametricity theorem to also prove that our
faceted values library is transparent [7, 27], ensuring
that programs that are already secure do not have their
semantics altered by our library.
More importantly, we inherit the simplicity of the
parametricity-based proof technique. In particular, our com-
pletely mechanized proof of noninterference for an actual
implementation in Agda [28] of the state-of-the-art LIO library
is an order of magnitude shorter than the previous partial Coq
proof for a model of the same library [10]. Moreover, the
simplicity of our proof technique allows us to cover more of
our implementation of the LIO library than the previous Coq
proof. Specifically, our mechanized LIO proof also covers the
non-trivial mechanisms that enable soundly recovering from
IFC and user-thrown exceptions [10, 29].
Concretely, we make the following contributions:
• We give Agda implementations of two core dynamic
IFC libraries: LIO [3, 10] (Section 4.2) and a faceted
values library inspired by the Faceted [22] and Multef [7]
Haskell libraries (Section 2).
• We use the parametricity theorem (Section 3) for these
dynamic IFC libraries to provide simple noninterference
proofs for any client of each library (Section 4).
• We use the same proof technique to also show that our
faceted values library satisfies transparency [7, 27], which
ensures that this library does not alter the semantics of
already secure programs. (Section 5).
• Our core libraries can be soundly extended to side effects
without additional proof obligations; we illustrate this by
adding mutable state to our core faceted values library
(Section 6). The key idea is simple [3, 6]: the noninterfer-
ence of any client of our core libraries, also holds for any
client library. In particular, a client library implementing
side effects using only the primitives exposed by the core
library automatically enjoys noninterference.
• Finally, all our proofs have been fully mechanized in the
module MultefImplementation where
data Fac : Set → Set where
return : {A : Set} → A → Fac A
facet : {A : Set} → Label → Fac A → Fac A
→ Fac A
bind : {A B : Set} → Fac A → (A → Fac B) → Fac B
bind (return a) c = c a
bind (facet ` f0 f1) c = facet ` (bind f0 c) (bind f1 c)
Fig. 1. Faceted values part of Multef in Agda
Agda proof assistant, and are available as supplementary
material for this paper.2 As a consequence of the use of
parametricity for dependent types, the implementation of
our libraries and the proofs are surprisingly short: our
whole formal development for the two different libraries
is less than one thousand lines of Agda.
While we use Agda as our language of choice in this paper,
we expect that our results are easily to generalize to other
languages with strong abstraction mechanisms and dependent
types, like Coq and F*, provided the requisite parametricity
theory can be established, which is already the case for
Coq [25].
2 Dynamic IFC as a Library
Before turning our attention to embedding dynamic IFC
as a library, we give a quick primer on our host language,
Agda: a total functional programming language with depen-
dent types [28].
One characteristic of Agda is that terms, types, and propo-
sitions are unified. Thus, a single dependent arrow type-
former (->) can be used to define function types and quan-
tifications. For example the type (x : Bool) -> Bool is a
function type whose domain and co-domain are Booleans.
The type (x : Bool) -> x ≡ true ∨ x ≡ false is an ex-
ample of a quantified proposition over booleans. The type
(A : Set) → List A → List A is that of a polymorphic list-
transformation. This last example illustrates quantification over
types, which is seen as a dependent function whose domain
is the type of types, written Set in Agda. (To avoid logical
inconsistencies sets of sets are organized in a tower, such that
Seti : Seti+1, and Set is a shorthand for Set0.)
As a convenience feature, Agda offers implicit arguments.
If a function domain is written with braces, for example
f : {A : Set} → List A → List A, then when calling the
function f one will omit the corresponding argument, for
example f someList : List A. In this situation, Agda will
try to infer the omitted argument from the context. For
example if someList : List Bool then A = Bool. If doing so
is impossible or ambiguous, Agda will report an error.
While Agda has many more features, we will only use a
small time-tested subset. We also make use of records, which
2Supplementary material available at
https://github.com/MaximilianAlgehed/DynamicIFCTheoremsForFree
will be discussed below, and some limited use of data types,
that work like in other functional languages.
Our first library is based on faceted values [22, 27] and is
displayed in Figure 1. This is a straightforward port of the
faceted values part of the Multef Haskell library [7] to Agda.
Faceted values are binary decision trees that can evaluate to
different values based on the privilege level of the observer.
Formally, a faceted value f : Fac A can either be a regular
value v : A that does not depend on who is observing it,
in which case f = return v, or it can depend on who is
observing it, in which case it is a tree node containing a
label ` : Label (we assume a base-type Label of security
labels explained below) and children f0 and f1 of type Fac A
(i.e., f = facet ` f0 f1). If an observer has access to level
` they will see f0, otherwise f1. For example, the faceted
value facet Alice (return 0) (return 1) : Fac Int looks
like 0 to anyone who is able to observe values with Alice’s
confidentiality level, and looks like 1 to everyone else.
Combining two faceted values also yields
a faceted value. For example, if we add
f0 = facet Alice (return 0) (return 1) and
f1 = facet Bob (return 2) (return 3), we get the
recursive faceted value:
f0+f1 = facet Alice
(facet Bob (return (0 + 2)) (return (0 + 3)))
(facet Bob (return (1 + 2)) (return (1 + 3)))
By inspecting this value, we see that if the observer can
observe both Alice’s and Bob’s data, they observe the sum
f0 + f1 as 0 + 2, whereas an observer who can see only Bob’s
data, not Alice’s, sees the sum as 1 + 2.
To formally define this addition operation on faceted
values we follow the literature [7, 22] and show that
faceted values form a monad [30, 31], which provides
a general computational tool we can use to easily
define operations like addition. A monad is a triple
of a type former, M : Set → Set (here M = Fac), and
two operations, return : {A : Set} → A → M A that
takes a pure value and embeds it into a monadic value,
and bind : {A B : Set} → M A → (A → M B) → M B
that takes a “computation” m : M a and a continuation
c : A → M B and produces a computation bind m c : M B.3
Using the monad operations, we can define addition and
similar operations for Fac easily in the following manner:
(+) : Fac Int → Fac Int → Fac Int
fx + fy = bind fx λ x →
bind fy λ y →
return (x + y)
The syntactic form λ x → ... in the code above is simply
Agda notation for lambda abstraction. Agda provides us with
a syntactic convenience for monadic computations in the form
of so-called do-notation. The code above can be written as:
(+) : Fac Int → Fac Int → Fac Int
fx + fy = do
3A monad requires bind and return to satisfy certain algebraic laws.
However, these are orthogonal to our development and thus omitted.
desugar =
do x ← m | bind m λ x →
c | desugar (do c)
desugar =
do m | bind m \ _ →
c | desugar (do c)
desugar =
do let x = e | let x = e in
m | desugar (do m)
Fig. 2. Rules for desugaring Agda’s do-notation
x ← fx
y ← fy
return (x + y)
Here, the syntax x ← e corresponds to the use of bind,
following the desugaring rules listed in Figure 2. We will use
this do-notation in the rest of the paper.
As illustrated by the addition example above, the bind
operation from Figure 1 works by traversing faceted values in
its operands and constructing a recursive faceted value, taking
into account all possible observers.
Following the IFC literature [32], whether a level can
be observed from another level is given by a partial order
_v_ : Label → Label → Bool. This order is also required
to form a join semi-lattice, and thus it has a least element
`⊥ : Label and the least-upper-bound always exists and is
given by the function _unionsq_ : Label -> Label -> Label. Us-
ing this lattice structure, we can define project l f, intu-
itively what a value of type f : Fac a will “look like” to an
observer at level l. We define project l f by recursion on f:
project : {A : Set} → Label → Fac A → A
project ` (return a) = a
project ` (facet `' f0 f1) =
if `' v ` then
project ` f0
else
project ` f1
In turn, from the definition of project, we can de-
fine what it means for a program, for example a function
p : Fac Int → Fac Int, to be secure. The program p is non-
interfering if given any label ` : Label and two faceted values
f0, f1 : Fac Int such that project ` f0 ≡ project ` f1
we have that project ` (p f0) ≡ project ` (p f1). In
other words, p does not reveal information from a different
security level to an observer at level `.
To see an example of this property in action, consider the
Temp client module in Figure 3. When we give isCold the
arguments f0 and f1 defined as:
f0 f1 : Fac Int
f0 = facet Alice (return 10) (return 0)
f1 = facet Alice (return 30) (return 0)
we get:
isCold f0 = facet Alice (return Cold) (return Cold)
isCold f1 = facet Alice (return Hot) (return Cold)
module Temp where
data HotOrCold : Set where
Hot : HotOrCold
Cold : HotOrCold
isCold : Fac Int → Fac HotOrCold
isCold fint = do
x <- fint
if x > 25 then
return Hot
else
return Cold
Fig. 3. A client of the Multef library
isAlicePos : Fac Int → Fac Bool
isAlicePos (facet Alice (return n) f) = return (n > 0)
isAlicePos f = return False
Fig. 4. An illbehaved client
If the observer level ` is Bob, who cannot
see Alice’s data (i.e., Bob 6v Alice) we have
that project f0 Bob ≡ project f1 Bob and also
project (isCold f0) Bob ≡ project (isCold f1) Bob.
The goal of library-based IFC is to ensure that all client
code behaves securely, as isCold does. However, suppose that
we could write the code in Figure 4. Function isAlicePos uses
pattern matching to check whether its faceted input is precisely
of the form facet Alice (return n) f, for some n and f,
and if so returns a raw (un)faceted value return (n > 0).
Otherwise isAlicePos returns return False. The function
isAlicePos clearly breaks noninterference. What goes wrong
here is that even though we carefully ensure that the func-
tions facet, return, and bind respect noninterference, the
isAlicePos client function could just side-step our interface
and break up faceted values to look directly at Alice’s secrets.
To ensure security, therefore, we must use the abstraction
mechanisms of the underlying programming language [33]. In
the case of Agda, this means two things. First, we must define
the interface of the IFC library, as a record type. In the case
of core Multef, the interface can be found in Figure 5.
Second, any client can depend only on this interface. For
Agda, this is ensured by parameterizing the client modules by
the IFC library interface, for example, the following will make
the BadClient module parametric:
record MultefInterface where
field
Fac : Set → Set
return : {A : Set} → A → Fac A
facet : {A : Set} → Label → Fac A → Fac A
→ Fac A
bind : {A B : Set} → Fac A → (A → Fac B)
→ Fac B
Fig. 5. The abstract interface to the Multef library
module BadClient (imp : MultefInterface) where
open MultefInterface imp
isAlicePos : Fac Int → Fac Bool
...
Then Agda will not allow us compile this module because of
the isAlicePos function: we get an error telling us that Fac
is an abstract type, and does not expose a constructor facet
on which we can pattern-match (in the interface, facet is just
a function and not a datatype constructor). Finally, we must
make sure that our secure implementation, which we will call
sec, indeed implements the interface. In Agda syntax:
sec : MultefInterface
sec = record {MultefImplementation}
In Section 4, we will use this abstraction barrier to provide a
relational interpretation for the Multef interface (in addition
to that of the LIO library [3]) and a proof that the implemen-
tation satisfies this relational interpretation. By the abstraction
theorem, all client modules will be proved to be noninterfering.
3 Parametricity and Data Abstraction
Before we dive into proving noninterference for our libraries,
we give a quick primer on constructive reasoning in Agda.
Using the propositions-as-types (also known as the Curry-
Howard) correspondence [34, 35], we can interpret Agda types
as propositions and programs as proofs in constructive logic:
The type of types is Set and inhabitants of this type can also
be seen as propositions. Type > : Set is inhabited by a trivial
tt : > inhabitant, and thus represents Truth as a proposition:
data > : Set where tt : >
Conversely ⊥ : Set is not inhabited by any term and thus rep-
resents Falsity. Conjunction _∧_ : Set → Set → Set and
disjunction _∨_ : Set → Set → Set are implemented as
product and sum types, respectively. Finally, as also explained
in the previous section, quantification and implication corre-
spond to the dependent function type (x : A) → B.
Since types are propositions, their inhabitants are proofs.
Concretely, if P : Set is a proposition (type) then t : P is
a proof (inhabitant) of the proposition (type). For example,
the canonical proof of proposition A ∧ B → B ∧ A is the
following function:
swap : A ∧ B → B ∧ A
swap (a , b) = (b , a)
With this background in place, we now introduce para-
metricity and data abstraction for dependently typed lan-
guages. This proof technique is based on logical relations [36,
37], which are an elegant tool to prove properties about
programming languages, and in particular IFC. The key idea
is that one interprets every type as a relation. For every type
A, one builds a relation JAK — thus JAK a0 a1 is a proposition
given two values a0 a1 : A and so JAK : A → A → Set. One
then proves the fundamental lemma of logical relations, also
known as abstraction theorem, or parametricity theorem:
Proposition 1 (Parametricity). If t : A then JAK t t. That is,
every program t of type A satisfies the relational interpretation
of its type JAK.
One often uses a custom logical relation [38], but there is
a general, most fundamental way to interpret dependent types
as relations, given by Bernardy et al. [25], which we adapt
below for the syntax of Agda types.4
Definition 1. (Relational interpretation of types) This meta-
level definition works by induction on the structure of types.
JSetiK A0 A1 = A0 → A1 → SetiJ(x:A) → BK f0 f1 = (x0 : A0)
→ (x1 : A1)
→ (xr : JAK x0 x1)
→ JBK (f0 x0) (f1 x1)Jrecord field fi : AiK r0 r1 = record field
fir : JAiK (fi r0) (fi r1)JBK b0 b1 = b0 ≡ b1
As mentioned above, the type of types (Set) is interpreted as
a function from two types to Set (i.e., a relation). A function
type is interpreted as a relation requiring that inhabitants
map related arguments to related results. A record type is
interpreted as a relation relating two instances of the record by
relating all their fields. Finally, base-types (B), like booleans,
are interpreted as propositional equality.
To prove the fundamental lemma, one proceeds by giving
a relational interpretation JtK for every term t: For our devel-
opment, this interpretation is as follows.
Definition 2. Relational interpretation of terms
Jt uK = JtKu0 u1 JuKJλx → tK = λx0 → λx1 → λxr →JtKJrecord {fi = ti}K = record {fir = JtiK}Jfi tK = fir JtKJxK = xrJbK = reflJAK = λa0 → λa1 →JAK a0 a1
This interpretation mimics the behavior of the relational
interpretation of types. In particular, if the term is a base type
constant (the penultimate case) then the proof of relatedness
is simply reflexivity of equality, and if the term is a type
(the last case), we construct an explicit relation and fall back
to the interpretation for types. Thus, the interpretation of
types as relation and the interpretation of terms as proofs can
be unified, hence the use of a single notation J·K for both
purposes. We refer the reader to Bernardy et al. [25] for details.
This relational interpretation of terms and types provides an
once and for all proof of the parametricity theorem:
4Their theory is for pure type systems with inductive families, covering all
the features of Agda that we use in this paper.
Theorem 1. (Parametricity [25])
If t : A then JtK : JAK t t.
As an illustration, we show how to use Theorem 1 to prove
properties about an abstract module and its clients. Consider
the following (restricted) interface for Booleans:
record Booleans where
field
Bool : Set
true : Bool
false : Bool
∧ : Bool → Bool → Bool
The above declares an abstract type, Bool, two constants true
and false of type Bool, and a binary operation ∧ over Bool.
We instantiate this interface in the standard way:
module Impl where
data Bool : Set where
true : Bool
false : Bool
∧ : Bool → Bool → Bool
∧ false _ = false
∧ _ b = b
booleans : Booleans
booleans = record {Impl}
What may be surprising about this Booleans interface is
that when we use it, we always end up writing mono-
tonic functions. More precisely, if we write a function
o : (imp : Booleans) → Bool imp → Bool imp, it is pos-
sible to prove, using parametricity, that if b0, b1 : Impl.Bool
are such that b0 implies b1 then o booleans b0 implies
o booleans b1. Intuitively, this is because the Booleans inter-
face gives the o function no way to do negation. This means
that all o imp can do to its b : Bool imp argument is to
either discard it and return some other boolean or take its
conjunction with some other boolean. These other booleans
are either constants, or obtained by calling functions, which
are themselves parametric in imp. However, “by induction”,
these functions are also monotonic and so o is monotonic.
Making this “by induction” phrase precise demands an argu-
ment based on logical relations. In Agda we can let Theorem 1
do the ground work, making the proof feel nearly automatic.
To see how this works formally, we need to understand two
things. Firstly, the standard relational interpretation of the
Booleans interface (JBooleansK, obtained mechanically by
using the meta-level function from Definition 1), tells us how
to relate two implementations of Booleans:5
record JBooleansK (m0 m1 : Booleans) : Set1 where
field
Boolr : Bool m0 → Bool m1 → Set
truer : Boolr (true m0) (true m1)
falser : Boolr (false m0) (false m1)
∧r : ∀ a0 a1 → Boolr a0 a1 →
∀ b0 b1 → Boolr b0 b1 →
Boolr (∧ m0 a0 b0) (∧ m1 a1 b1)
5Accessing a record field is done by treating the field name as a function
with the analyzed record as an additional first argument.
This relation contains a custom logical relation (Boolr), such
that each method in the interface respects this relation (and
truer, falser, ∧r are proofs witnessing this).
Secondly, because o is parameterized by imp : Booleans,
we have that JoK is parameterized over JBooleansK:JoK : (imp0 imp1 : Booleans)
→ (impr : JBooleansK imp0 imp1)
→ (b0 : Bool imp0) (b1 : Bool imp1)
→ (br : Boolr impr b0 b1)
→ Boolr impr (o imp0 b0) (o imp1 b1)
Now all it takes to prove our theorem is to realize that:
1) We care about two Bool booleans, so we have to take
imp0 = imp1 = booleans, and
2) impr : JBooleansK booleans booleans is an argument
to JoK that we get to pick, and
3) the final thing we want to prove is that if
b0 ⇒ b1, then o ... b0 ⇒ o ... b1, so we want that
Boolr b0 b1 = b0 ⇒ b1.
With insight (2) and (3) and a definition of ⇒ as a relation
on Bool:
_⇒_ : Bool -> Bool -> Set
true ⇒ false = ⊥
_ ⇒ _ = >
we can define the fields of booleansr as follows:
booleansr : JBooleansK booleans booleans
booleansr = record {
Boolr = _⇒_
; truer = tt
; falser = tt
; ∧r true true ar b0 b1 br = br
∧r false a1 ar b0 b1 br = tt
}
The proofs that true and false satisfy the relation are trivial.
For ∧, we proceed by a simple case analysis. This gives us all
the pieces we need to construct our monotonicity proof:JoK booleans booleans booleansr :
(b0 : Bool booleans) → (b1 : Bool booleans)
→ (br : b0 ⇒ b1) → o booleans b0 ⇒ o booleans b1
Now, suppose we add negation to the interface of Booleans,
with the usual implementation in booleans:
record Booleans : Set1 where
field
...
neg : Bool -> Bool
module Impl where
...
neg : Bool → Bool
neg true = false
neg false = true
booleans : Booleans
booleans = record {Impl}
If we try to prove the same monotonicity theorem, which now
shouldn’t hold, we run into issues when we try to provide negr
in the new booleansr. Specifically, trying to fulfill the proof
obligation by case analysis leaves us with an impossible goal:
negr : (a0 a1 : Bool) → a0 ⇒ a1
→ neg booleans a0 ⇒ neg booleans a1
negr true true tt = tt
negr false true tt = ? -- Goal is true ⇒ false
negr false false tt = tt
As demonstrated by this example, parametricity for depen-
dent types is not just an adequate tool for reasoning about
metatheoretic properties of libraries, it’s also compositional.
To prove that a library guarantees some property, one simply
defines the necessary relations on one’s types and proves
that each operation preserves these relations. In Section 4 we
use this technique to show noninterference for two security
libraries. The proofs work like the simple proof above: we
define the relations necessary to prove noninterference and
show that each operation in the library respects the relations.
4 Two Proofs of Noninterference
In this section we use the parametricity technique outlined
above to prove noninterference for two dynamic IFC libraries.
The first proof (Section 4.1) is for the faceted values part of
the Multef Haskell library, which we have already introduced
in Section 2. The second proof is for the significantly more
complex LIO library (Section 4.2).
4.1 Noninterference for Faceted Values
Recall the faceted values interface in Figure 5 from Sec-
tion 2. It exports a type Fac for faceted values and operations
facet, return, and bind for manipulating them. The goal in
this section is to show that any client library of this abstract
interface obeys noninterference.
Intuitively, this means that any client function of
MultefImplementation needs to take `-equivalent inputs to `-
equivalent outputs. In order to make this meaningful we recall
the sec instantiation of MultefInterface and the definition of
project from Section 2 and provide the following definition of
`-equivalence: If A is a base-type and f0, f1 : Fac A we say
that f0 and f1 are `-equivalent, written f0 ∼〈 ` 〉 f1, when:
f0 ∼〈 ` 〉 f1 = project f0 ` ≡ project f1 `
Where ≡ is propositional equality.
In order to prove noninterference, we need to prove that,
for a given base-type A (say Bool), o : Fac A → Fac A
and if f0 ∼〈 ` 〉 f1 then o f0 ∼〈 ` 〉 o f1. However, this
only holds if o is a function in a client of the Multef
library (more accurately, its abstract interface). In other
words, noninterference only needs to hold for a function
o : (m : MultefInterface) → Fac m A → Fac m A.
Recall from the Booleans example in Section 3
that we can reason about o by providing a suitable
secr : JMultefK sec sec, a proof that sec (from Section 2):
sec : MultefInterface
sec = record {MultefImplementation}
satisfies the relational interpretation of its type. Formally,
parametricity requires us to construct a fr : JAK f f for
each function f : A in the MultefInterface record type.
Facr : (A0 A1 : Set)
→ (Ar : JSetK A0 A1)
→ JSetK (Fac sec A0) (Fac sec A1)
facetr : (A0 A1 : Set) → (Ar : JSetK A0 A1)
→ (`0 `1 : Label) → (J`K : JLabelK `0 `1)
→ (f00 : Fac sec A0) → (f01 : Fac sec A1)
→ (f0r : Facr A0 A1 Ar f00 f01)
→ (f10 : Fac sec A0) → (f11 : Fac sec A1)
→ (f1r : Facr A0 A1 Ar f10 f11)
→ Facr A0 A1 Ar (facet sec `0 f00 f10)
(facet sec `1 f01 f11)
returnr : (A0 A1 : Set) → (Ar : JSetK A0 A1)
→ (a0 : A0) → (a1 : A1) → (ar : Ar a0 a1)
→ Facr A0 A1 Ar (return sec a0) (return sec a1)
bindr : (A0 A1 : Set) → (Ar : JSetK A0 A1)
→ (B0 B1 : Set) → (Br : JSetK B0 B1)
→ (f0 : Fac sec A0) → (f1 : Fac sec A1)
→ (fr : Facr A0 A1 Ar f0 f1)
→ (c0 : A0 → Fac sec B0) → (c1 : A1 → Fac sec B1)
→ (cr : (a0 : A0) → (a1 : A1) → (ar : Ar a0 a1)
→ Facr B0 B1 Br (c0 a0) (c1 a1))
→ Facr B0 B1 Br (bind sec f0 c0) (bind sec f1 c1)
Fig. 6. Fields in JMultefInterfaceK sec sec
Concretely, this means that to construct secr, we need to
construct Agda terms inhabiting the four types in Figure 6.
Picking our implementation of
secr : JMultefInterfaceK sec sec that we will use in
our noninterference proof is straightforward given our
formulation of the f0 ∼〈 ` 〉 f1 relation above. Given `* as
the attacker-level that we are concerned about, we pick:
Facr A0 A1 Ar f0 f1 = Ar (project f0 `*) (project f1 `*)
Note that if A is a base type, then JAK = _≡_ and so
Facr A A JAK corresponds to ∼〈 `* 〉. The definitions of
facetr, returnr, and bindr are easy to fill out, and can be
looked up in the Agda mechanization.6
Theorem 2 (Noninterference for Faceted Execution). Given:
o : (m : MultefInterface) → Fac m Bool → Fac m Bool
We know that for all f0, f1 : Fac sec Bool such that there
exists a term:
assume : f0 ∼〈 `* 〉 f1
We show that:
o sec f0 ∼〈 `* 〉 o sec f1
Proof. From Theorem 1, we know that the following holds:
JoK : (m0 m1 : MultefInterface)
→ (mr : JMultefInterfaceK m0 m1)
→ (f0 : Fac m0 Bool) → (f1 : Fac m1 Bool)
→ (fr : Facr mr Bool Bool JBoolK f0 f1)
→ Facr mr Bool Bool JBoolK (o m0 f0) (o m1 f1)
We have chosen secr : JMultefInterfaceK sec sec so that:
Facr secr Bool Bool JBoolK f0 f1 = f0 ∼〈 `* 〉 f1
This means that:
JoK sec sec f0 f1 assume : o sec f0 ∼〈 `* 〉 o sec f1
And is thus a valid Agda proof term for our theorem.
6It may be helpful to recall that Label is a base-type, so theJLabelK `0 `1 argument to facetr is equivalent to `0 ≡ `1.
record LIOInterface : Set1 where
field
-- Labeled Values
Labeled : Set → Set
label : {A : Set} → Label → A → Labeled A
labelOf : {A : Set} → Labeled A → Label
-- LIO Computations
LIO : Set → Set
return : {A : Set} → A → LIO A
bind : {A B : Set} → LIO A
→ (A → LIO B) → LIO B
unlabel : {A : Set} → Labeled A → LIO A
toLabeled : {A : Set} → Label
→ LIO A → LIO (Labeled A)
-- Exceptions
throw : {A : Set} → UserError → LIO A
catch : {A : Set} → LIO A
→ (E → LIO A) → LIO A
sec : LIOInterface
sec = { Labeled A = (A unionmulti E) × Label
; LIO A = (`c : Label) → Σ ((A unionmulti E) × Label)
(λ r → `c v pi2 r)
; ... }
Fig. 7. Our Agda port of the core LIO library
4.2 Noninterference for Core LIO
Next we turn our attention to LIO. We first explain our Agda
port of LIO and then how we use parametricity to prove
noninterference for it. Our port covers both the original LIO
library [3] and a more recent extension to allow recovering
from user-defined and IFC exceptions [10], but leaves out state
(in Section 6 we give a simple way state could be added for
free on top of this core library) and clearance (a concern not
directly related to IFC that could also be easily added). The
interface of the core library can be seen in Figure 7, but most
of the implementation has been elided for space. Instead on
focusing on the code, we give the intuition behind this library.
The interface first defines Labeled A, the abstract type of
labeled values of type A. If v is a value of type A and ` is an
IFC label, then we can use the label ` v operation to classify
value v at level `, which results in a labeled value of type
Labeled A. Once we have a Labeled value we can use labelOf
to obtain its label, which witnesses the fact that, in LIO, the
label on data is public information. Unlike the label, the value
of a lv : Labeled A is not public, but protected precisely by
labelOf lv. This means that it would not be secure to simply
extract the value of lv, so the LIO interface provides no such
operation. Instead, to work with labeled values in a way that
ensures IFC we need to turn to labeled LIO computations.
An LIO computation keeps track of a current label, which is
the upper bound of all labeled values already inspected by the
computation. LIO threads through the current label, and in our
case we also produce an explicit proof that the current label
can only increase in the IFC lattice, or stay the same. This
(monotonic) state passing makes LIO a monad, with return
and bind operations having analogous type signatures to those
for faceted execution. In addition, the LIO monad provides
an unlabel operation that soundly returns the value inside a
labeled value lv by increasing the current label by labelOf lv:
unlabel : {A : Set} → Labeled A → LIO A
This allows LIO computations to process labeled data, while
using the current label to track both explicit and implicit
information flows (i.e., flows through the control flow of the
program [32]). Once we are done computing based on labeled
values we can label the result and restore the current label to
what it was at the beginning of the current computation. To
prevent leaking information via the label of the final result,
this label has to be chosen in advance before inspecting
any labeled data. This functionality is implemented by the
following operation:
toLabeled : {A : Set} → Label
→ LIO A → LIO (Labeled A)
The expression toLabeled ` lio runs the lio computation
and if at the end the current label is below ` the result is
labeled ` and the current label restored. On the other hand, if
at the end the current label is not below ` we have to signal an
IFC error. The original LIO [3] treated such errors as fatal and
stopped execution, however a more recent extension of LIO
[10] makes IFC errors recoverable. In the case of a wrongly
annotated toLabeled though, throwing an exception would not
be sound: we can restore the current label at the end only if
that is a control-flow join point. To preserve this property, LIO
returns instead a delayed exception [29], which is another kind
of labeled value, labeled with the originally chosen level `.
When unlabeling it the delayed exception is re-thrown, which
is sound because, as explained above, unlabeling a value raises
the current label.
In addition to re-throwing delayed exceptions on unlabel,
LIO provides standard primitives to throw user exceptions
and to catch arbitrary ones. In order to achieve soundness,
though, LIO also has to delay any such exceptions at the
end of toLabeled. To make debugging easier, all exceptions
carry information such as the current label at the time the
exception was originally thrown together with a stack trace. In
addition, IFC exceptions record additional information about
the involved labels, when this information can be securely
revealed (e.g., when the label check fails for toLabeled ` it
is secure to reveal the label `, but not the current label that is
not below `).
With this intuition in place, we can look at the actual
definitions of the Labeled and LIO types. The definition of
Labeled is straightforward: a labeled value is a pair of a Label
and either a result of type A, or a delayed exception of type E,
Labeled A = (A unionmulti E) × Label, where unionmulti denotes the tagged
sum, or “disjunctive union”:
data _unionmulti_ : Set → Set → Set where
inj1 : {A B : Set} → A → A unionmulti B
inj2 : {A B : Set} → B → A unionmulti B
The definition of LIO meanwhile, is more involved. A
term of type LIO A is a function that takes a current label
`c : Label and produces a result that we call a configuration.
A configuration is an output label together with either a result
of type A or a delayed exception of type E (that’s either a user
exception or an IFC exception whose details are omitted here).
However, as noted above we make the LIO computation also
produce a proof that the output label is at least as restrictive as
the input label `c. This addition is opaque to the programmer,
who programs against the abstract interface of LIO, but is
useful for simplifying our proofs, since it prevents the logical
relation below from being cluttered with this monotonicity
proof. Consequently, the definition of LIO is as follows:
-- Configuration
Cfg A = (A unionmulti E) × Label
-- LIO computation
LIO A = (`c : Label) -- Input label
→ Σ (Cfg A) -- Result
(λ r → `c v pi2 r) -- Useful proof
This definition uses a generalized sum type, or Σ-type, to
connect the proof of monotonic labels to the computation. The
Σ type-former is given by the following record type:
record Σ (A : Set) (B : A → Set) : Set where
field pi1 : A
pi2 : B pi1
and we additionally have the notation (a , b) for
record {pi1=a, pi2=b}. Finally, to avoid confusion we note
that the _,_-syntax is shared between Σ-types and simple
product types (A × B), indeed the latter is an instantiation of
the former: A × B = Σ A (λ _ → B).
With this background in place, we turn to stating nonin-
terference for LIO. We do this for any client function that is
parametric in the LIO interface, takes a labeled boolean input,
and performs a LIO computation returning a boolean as result:
o : (m : LIOInterface) → Labeled m Bool → LIO m Bool
To state noninterference for o sec we need to define `*-
equivalence for labeled values and LIO computations.
We say that two labeled values lv0, lv1 : Labeled Bool
are indistinguishable at an observer label `*, written
lv0 ∼〈 `* 〉 lv1, if and only if:
1) labelOf lv0 ≡ labelOf lv1 and
2) if labelOf lv0 v `* then lv0 ≡ lv1
Point 1 says that the labels of lv0 and lv1 may never diverge
from each other, since they are public information. Point 2 says
that if lv0 (and therefore also lv1) is a public level, then lv0
and lv1 have to be equal.
Next we turn our attention to the relation for Bool-returning
LIO computations. Firstly, recall that c0 and c1 are state-
passing computations where the state is the current label:
Label → Σ ((Bool + E) × Label) .... Because the current
label is not necessarily public, but instead it protects itself,
the standard way to define `*-equivalence for the current label
is the following:
`c0 ∼〈 `* 〉 `c1 = (`c0 v `* ∨ `c1 v `*) → `c0 ≡ `c1
Two current labels are `*-equivalent if whenever one of them
is observable at level `* the other label is the same. We extend
this to final configurations of type (Bool + E) × Label:
(r0 , `c0) ∼〈 `* 〉 (r1 , `c1) =
(`c0 ∼〈 `* 〉 `c1) ∧ (`c0 v `* ∧ `c1 v `* → r0 ≡ r1)
For two configurations to be `*-equivalent, we require that the
current labels are `*-equivalent and if they are public then the
results of the computation should also be equal. With this in
place, it is easy to define `*-equivalence for LIO computations:
c0 ∼〈 `* 〉 c1 = (`c0 `c1:Label) → `c0 ∼〈 `* 〉 `c1 →
pi1 (c0 `c0) ∼〈 `* 〉 pi1 (c1 `c1)
This requires that for any `*-equivalent initial current labels
we obtain `*-equivalent final configurations (the pi1 projections
are needed to ignore the proof part of the LIO type).
With these definitions in place we can now state our
noninterference theorem:
Theorem 3 (Noninterference). Given:
o : (m : LIOInterface) → Labeled m Bool → LIO m Bool
For all lv0, lv1 : Labeled sec Bool we assume that:
lv0 ∼〈 `* 〉 lv1
We show that:
o sec lv0 ∼〈 `* 〉 o sec lv1
The general strategy of the proof is the same as for Multef.
In particular we use Theorem 1 to obtain:JoK : (m0 m1 : LIOInterface)
→ (mr : JLIOInterfaceK m0 m1)
→ (l0 : Labeled m0 Bool) → (l1 : Labeled m1 Bool)
→ (lr : Labeledr mr Bool Bool JBoolK l0 l1)
→ LIOr mr Bool Bool JBoolK (o m0 l0) (o m1 l1)
To use this result we first need to pick two relations
Labeledr : JSet → SetK Labeled Labeled and
LIOr : JSet → SetK LIO LIO and prove that relatedness at
these relations is respected by the LIO operations. Moreover,
to be helpful for proving noninterference these relations have
to specialize (e.g., for Bool) to the `*-equivalence instances
from in the noninterference statement above.
For labeled values, we use a straightforward generalization
of the `*-equivalence definition above:
Labeledr A0 A1 Ar lv0 lv1 =
(labelOf m0 lv0 ≡ labelOf m1 lv1) ∧
(labelOf m0 lv0 v `* → (Ar JunionmultiK Er) (pi1 lv0) (pi1 lv1))
(Where the relation Ar JunionmultiK Br relates two values if they are
either inj1 and related by Ar or inj2 and related by Br.) In the
second conjunct, we require that if the level of the two labeled
values is public then either they are both errors related at Er,
or they both carry values of type A that are related at Ar. The
relation Er : E → E → Set relates two delayed exceptions if
and only if they are the same. We do a similar generalization
from Bool to arbitrary types for defining LIOr.
The main part of our Agda proof of Theorem 3 was
showing that the LIO operations respect the Labeledr and LIOr
relations. Some of the LIO operations have straightforward
proofs (label, return, labelOf, unlabel, and throw), while
the higher-order operations (bind, toLabeled, and catch), have
slightly more interesting proofs that rely on the monotonicity
of the current label. Fortunately, all these proofs are pleasantly
short adding up to under 300 lines of Agda for the complete
noninterference proof in our supplementary material.
The short and fully mechanized Agda proof we describe
above can be contrasted with the previous partially mechanized
proof for LIO [10]. This previous proof shows noninterference
for an abstract calculus without exception handling and state,
covering a strict subset of the features of the library imple-
mentation that we have verified here. Their proof technique,
to show a simulation between evaluation of an LIO term
with secrets and the same term with the secrets erased, is
standard but cumbersome. Consequently, their proof amounts
to over 3000 lines of Coq, even if it is not fully mechanized
and it only covers a small calculus, not a concrete library
implementation. Their proof could probably be finished and
made shorter by using more tactic automation or a different
proof strategy [29], yet it seems hard to match the conceptual
simplicity and compactness of our parametricity-based proof.
5 Transparency
One of the primary justifications for faceted semantics is the
so-called transparency theorem [27]. In short, transparency
states that: for any program p that is noninterfering under a
non-faceted, “standard” semantics, the behavior of p is pre-
served when p is run with faceted semantics. Intuitively, this
means that there are no false alarms with faceted execution:
if the program is noninterfering to begin with, facets don’t
change anything. This is unlike systems like LIO, where false
alarms are a problem that the programmer has to work around
by adhering to proper programming style.
In our setting, this transparency property can be reformu-
lated in terms of one of the key lemmas used to prove both
noninterference and transparency for traditional faceted cal-
culi: faceted evaluation simulates standard evaluation [27, 39].
To make sense of what this means in our context we need
to explain the distinction between faceted and standard eval-
uation. Luckily, it is straightforward for us to define what we
mean by different semantics for the same program: we simply
give different implementations of the MultefInterface! In
particular, the faceted semantics was already defined as the
MultefImplementation module in Figure 1 from Section 2.
Maybe : Set → Set
Maybe A = A unionmulti >
just : {A : Set} → A → Maybe A
just a = inj1 a
nothing : {A : Set} → Maybe A
nothing = inj2 tt
JMaybeK : (A0 A1 : Set) → (Ar : A0 → A1 → Set)
→ Maybe A0 → Maybe A1 → SetJMaybeK _ _ Ar = Ar JunionmultiK J>K
Fig. 8. The Maybe type former and its relational interpretation.
module Std where
Fac : Set → Set
Fac a = Maybe a
facet : {A : Set} → L → Fac A
→ Fac A → Fac A
facet ` f0 f1 = nothing
return : {A : Set} → A → Fac A
return a = just a
bind : {A B : Set} → Fac A
→ (A → Fac B) → Fac B
bind f c = case f of \
{ inj1 a → c a
; inj2 tt → inj2 tt }
std : MultefInterface
std = record {Std}
Fig. 9. Standard Semantics of Multef
To define the standard semantics, we first introduce the
Maybe (also known as “option”) type former, as a special
case of the unionmulti type, in Figure 8. With this in place, we
define the standard semantics of Multef in Figure 9. Most
of the definitions are unsurprising: Fac A is Maybe A, while
return and bind are standard for the Maybe monad. The only
potentially surprising definition is facet ` f0 f1 = nothing.
To understand it, note that the standard phrasing of the
transparency property in the literature makes reference to
facet-free programs [7, 27, 39]. In our setting, we cannot easily
talk about such “facet-free” programs, because all programs
we study are clients of the MultefInterface, so instead we
make do by talking about programs that do not return nothing
under evaluation in the standard semantics.
Theorem 4 (Transparency). Fix a label `* : Label. Given
any b : Bool, define the faceted value fb as having value b
for observers that can see data labeled `*, and value false
otherwise as:
fb = facet sec Bool `* (return sec b)
(return sec false)
For any client function o, parametric in MultefInterface:
o : (m : MultefInterface) → Fac m Bool → Fac m Bool,
which does not crash under the standard semantics (std) when
given the non-faceted constant b as input:
o std (just b) 6≡ nothing,
then running o std (just b) yields the same result from the
point of view of an observer at level `* as running o with the
faceted semantics (sec) on input fb:
o std (just b) ≡ just Bool (o sec fb `*)
To prove Theorem 4 we need to relate the execution of
o std with the execution of o sec. According to our setup,
Theorem 1 gives us that if o : (m : MultefInterface) → T
for some type T, then:JoK : (m0 m1 : MultefInterface)
→ (mr : JMultefInterfaceK m0 m1)
→ JTK (o m0) (o m1)
In particular, if we can provide some
std-secr : JMultefInterfaceK std sec, then parametricity
lets us relate o std and o sec.
As we have seen with the previous proofs in this paper, the
key to getting this to work is picking the correct instantiation
of Facr in std-secr. In this case the choice is clear from the
theorem that we are trying to prove. We want that, when the
standard (non-faceted) result is not nothing, the projection at
`* of the value resulting from the faceted execution is related
to the standard value. In other words, we pick the following
definition of Facr in std-secr:
Facr std-secr = λ A0 A1 Ar f0 f1 → f0 6≡ nothing →JMaybeK A0 A1 Ar f0 (just (project f1 `*))
From this definition, filling out facetr, returnr, and bindr is
straightforward. With the definition of std-secr in place, we
can tackle the proof of Theorem 4.
Proof of Theorem 4. From:
o : (m : MultefInterface) → Fac m Bool → Fac m Bool
We obtain by parametricity:JoK : (m0 m1 : MultefInterface)
→ (mr : JMultefInterfaceK m0 m1)
→ (f0 : Fac m0 Bool) → (f1 : Fac m1 Bool)
→ (fr : Facr mr Bool Bool JBoolK f0 f1)
→ Facr mr Bool Bool JBoolK (o m0 f0) (o m1 f1)
We pick m0 = std, m1 = sec, mr = std-secr, f0 = just b,
f1 = f
b, and let fr be some (omitted) proof that f0 and f1
are appropriately related7
fr : Facr std-secr Bool Bool JBoolK f0 f1,
whose type becomes this after unfolding definitions:
fr : just b 6≡ nothing →JMaybeK Bool Bool _≡_ (just b)
(just (project fb `*)).
This gives us the following instantiation for JoK:JoK std sec std-secr (just b) fb fr :
o std (just b) 6≡ nothing →
7The reader will find its definition in the Agda mechanization of this paper
module FacState (imp : MultefInterface) where
open MultefInterface imp
-- FSt Computations
State : Set
State = String → Bool
FSt : Set → Set
FSt = State → Fac (State × A)
-- Monadic Fragment
return : {A : Set} → A → FSt A
return a = λ s → return (s , a)
bind : {A B : Set} → FSt A
→ (A → FSt B) → FSt B
bind f c = λ s → do
(s' , a) ← f
c a s'
lift : {A : Set} → Fac A → FSt A
lift f = λ s → do
a ← f
return (s , a)
-- State Monad
get : FSt State
get = λ s → return (s , s)
put : State → FSt >
put s' = λ s → return (s' , tt)
-- Derived Operations
read : String → FSt Bool
read var = do
s ← get
return (s var)
write : String → Bool → FSt >
write var val = do
s ← get
put (λ var' → if var==var' then
val
else
s var')
Fig. 10. FacState implementation on top of Multef
JMaybeK Bool Bool _≡_ (o std (just b))
(just (project (o sec fb) `*)).
This is sufficient to easily establish the theorem.
The key takeaway from this proof is the generality of
parametricity as a proof technique. While previous proofs
have focused on the connection between noninterference and
parametricity [26, 40, 41], the proof above shows that para-
metricity can also be useful for proving other interesting meta-
theoretical properties about security libraries.
6 Supporting Effects
The libraries that we have investigated so far only offer
dynamic IFC functionality for programs without side effects.
However, following Algehed and Russo [6], we can use
the old trick of Monad Transformers [42] to extend our
current libraries with monadic side effects. In short, a monad
transformer is something that can take a monad and add
extra functionality to it, while retaining the monadic structure.
Formally, a monad transformer is a function:
T : (Set → Set) → (Set → Set)
Such that if M : Set → Set is a monad, then so is T M.
Furthermore, T M must retain the structure of M, and so there
is required to be a function:
lift : {A : Set} → M A → T M A
with the role of lifting M-computations to T M computations.
The quintessential example of a monad transformer is
StateT. This monad transformer makes a monad stateful, by
threading through a state of type State using the following
transformation:
StateT M A = State → M (State × A).
In other words, a StateT M A computation is a computation
that starts with an initial state and performs some actions in
M and produces a new state and a result A.
Figure 10 shows the special case of how we can instantiate
the StateT monad transformer with the Fac monad to create
the FSt monad (for “faceted state”) . The definitions of return,
bind, and lift are straightforward. By abuse of notation, we
allow the names return and bind, and so also the use of do-
notation, to overlap between the M and StateT M monads.
On top of these mundane monadic operations, StateT also
provides functions for accessing and updating the state in
a computation, get and put. Furthermore, with the specific
instantiation of the State type in the FacState module,
mapping strings to booleans, we can also define more practical
read and write operations to update a single mapping.
The module FacState abstractly depends on the
MultefInterface, and so the extension constitutes what
we have previously called “client code”. This means that
we have no proof obligation for noninterference for FSt
computations, it follows from noninterference for the
sec : MultefInterface instantiation of the Multef interface.
That is, because all the code of this section treats Multef
abstractly, we do not need to define any special logical
relation or proof, and can use the standard interpretation of
Definitions 1 and 2.
The FSt monad allows us to implement the following
canonical example for faceted state adapted from Austin and
Flanagan [27]:
example : Fac Bool → FSt Bool
example fx = do
write "y" True
write "z" True
x ← lift fx
if x then write "y" False else return tt
y ← read "y"
if y then write "z" False else return tt
z ← read "z"
return z
The module in Figure 10 is parametric in the implementa-
tion imp : MultefInterface of the faceted library. One only
obtains actual runnable code by linking this module with the
implementation of MultefInterface one is interested in. Natu-
rally, whatever guarantees are provided by that implementation
will then be inherited by the resulting FacState imp module.
This means that noninterference for FacState sec follows au-
tomatically from noninterference for sec : MultefInterface.
7 Related and Future Work
Dynamic IFC libraries, like LIO [3] and Multef [7], promise
to provide noninterference guarantees without the need for a
specialized tool-chain. Embedding such libraries in existing
languages allows programmers to reuse the functionality and
library ecosystem of the host language. Case studies show that
this is a promising direction for IFC [3, 13, 43].
Stefan et al. [10] provide a noninterference proof for LIO
verified by Coq, which we improve upon in several ways. First,
we cover a larger subset of the features of LIO. Crucially, we
additionally support one key feature of LIO: allowing the user
to catch IFC exceptions. Second, our proofs fit in just under
300 lines of Agda, while the proof of noninterference of Stefan
et al. [10] is more than 3000 lines of Coq.
We achieve this order-of-magnitude improvement partly by
using logical-relations to reason about LIO. However, this
alone is not sufficient to achieve the concise proof that we have
presented here. We also rely on Theorem 1 to automatically
derive the relational interpretation of the “standard” parts of
the language (crucially λ-abstraction): a large part of what one
would traditionally need to carry out manually.
Third, and importantly, we certify the library itself, rather
than a model of the library — an issue which affects much of
the library-based IFC literature. This issue is not surprising,
because in order to be practical the libraries are implemented
in languages that are lacking a formal semantics based on
logical relations. Formalizing library-based IFC would require
developing such a semantics first — a daunting task for a
full-featured language. In contrast, we use a less mainstream
language, Agda, but, in return, there is no informal, unverified,
modeling step remaining in our approach.
To be sure, this means that we also do not claim to provide
guarantees for the Haskell implementation of the libraries,
but rather the Agda implementation in this paper. However,
we believe this paper demonstrates that as techniques for
reasoning about logical relations for languages like Haskell
are developed further, the necessary meta-theory for practical
IFC libraries will come within reach of our techniques.
Specifically, there are a number of Haskell libraries for
IFC that rely on complicated language features for controlling
concurrency [19, 44] and parallelism [45] and specialized
primitives for managing laziness [20]. In order to be able to
reason about the implementation of IFC libraries that use these
features, meta-theoretical tools akin to the parametricity theory
that we rely on will need to be developed for Haskell.
Another difference between Haskell and Agda is that Agda
is a total language, so all code written in it is guaranteed
to terminate and so the termination channel [46] is a non-
issue. Extending our techniques to deal with nontermination,
and specifically to deal with libraries that protect against
termination leaks (e.g., [7, 19]), is interesting future work.
In particular, we hope to build on various monadic represen-
tations of nontermination in dependent type theory [47, 48].
Last but not least, Algehed and Bernardy [26] pioneered the
technique of using parametricity for dependent types to show
noninterference for a security library. They are concerned with
static IFC libraries, while we show that the technique extends
naturally to libraries for dynamic IFC libraries. Furthermore,
in Theorem 4 we show that the parametricity proof-technique
works well for proving meta-theoretical properties other than
noninterference for security libraries using this approach.
8 Conclusion
This paper shows the versatility of parametricity as a proof
technique for language-based security. Specifically, we show
that parametricity can be used to prove noninterference for
two different dynamic IFC libraries as well as transparency
for the faceted values library.
Ours are the first proofs of noninterference for dynamic IFC
libraries that are about the actual implementation of a library.
Previous proofs of noninterference for dynamic IFC libraries
(e.g. [3, 7]) are about separate lambda-calculus that mimics the
semantics of the library, rather than about the library itself.
Furthermore, using parametricity allows us to give compact
yet fully machine-checked proofs.
We believe that the simplicity of the proof techniques used
in this paper will be key to scaling noninterference proofs to
cover the actual code of more feature-rich IFC libraries, like
concurrent [8, 19, 20] and cryptographic [4] LIO.
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